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COMMENTS
A CONFUSION OF CRIME AND SEMANTICS
Lnited States v. Fahe, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1969)
Defendant failed to file income tax returns for three years and was
charged with the wilful failure to file those returns in violation of 26
U.S.C. § 7203.' He alleged the omissions were not wilful, but a
product of his emotional and psychological disturbances. The trial
court convicted defendant, finding as a matter of fact that his
omissions were "voluntary, deliberate, intentional, and purposeful,
and done with a bad purpose. ' '2 On appeal, defendant argued that a
wilful state of mind cannot be established without proof of an intent
to defraud the government. HELD: Affirmed. A wilful failure to file
income tax returns' is established by voluntary, deliberate, intentional,
and purposeful conduct, done with a bad purpose; an intent to
defraud the government is not necessary.-
The court of appeals states that there is a difference between the
meaning of "wilfully" in the felony statute, which requires an intent
to defraud the government, and "wilfully" in the misdemeanor
statute." For the purpose of Section 7203, the misdemeanor statute,
"wilfully" means only "with a bad purpose or without grounds for
believing that one's act is lawful or without reasonable cause or
capriciously or with a careless disregard whether one has the right so
to act,"7  It is necessary that the omission-failure to file a
return be accompanied by a conscious desire to escape the payment
of taxes as the felony statute requires.' The trial court found, as a
I. Ili Ri % CODE of 1954. § 7203 provides:
Ans person required under this title to pay any estimated tax or tax, or required by this
title or b regulations made under authority thereof to make a return ... who willfully
fails to pa such estimated tax or tax, make such return .... at the time or times
required bN las% or regulations, shall. . . . be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon
coniction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than I
year, or hoth. together A ith the costs of prosecution.
(Emphasis added.)
2. United States % Fahey, - F. Supp ... (N.D. Cal. 19.._-).
3. Lnited States v -ahey, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1969).
4 I[I Rt% CODE of 1954, § 7203.
5. LUnited States v Fahey, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1969).
6. Id at - 0 Spies v United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497-99 (1943).
7. United States v Fahey, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1969); Martin v. United States, 317 F.2d
753, 754 (9th Cir 1963): \bdul v. United States, 254 F.2d 292, 294 (9th Cir. 1958); cf. Eustis
v. United States, 409 F 2d 228 (9th Cir. 1969); Edwards v. United States, 375 F.2d 862 (9th
Cir. 1967)
8. Sansone % United States, 380 U.S 343 (1965); Spies v. United States. 317 U.S. 492
(1943)
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matter of fact, that defendant's failure to file the returns was
"voluntary, deliberate, intentional and purposeful . . . . with bad
purpose in that by his particular knowledge, . .. (of the statutory
requirement to file, he) . . . was aware that there were no reasonable or
justifiable grounds for failure to timely file such tax returns."'
Therefore, the defendant's state of mind was sufficient to support a
conviction for violation of Section 7203.
The court's reaffirmation of its instructions defining "wilfully"
perpetuates a conflict existing between the circuits over the language
used to define the state of mind required for a violation of Section
7203.10 The precise conflict centers on the use of capriciously or with
careless disregard whether one has the right so to act in the definition
of "wilfully." This language was rejected by the Fifth and Third
Circuits as an inadequate description of the mens rea required for the
violation of Section 7203.11 Despite these rejections, the Ninth Circuit
continues to use this language in its instruction on "wilfully" for this
section .12
No court has held that negligent or inadvertent 13 violation of
Section 7203 suffices for a conviction. 4 Neither the failure to file a
9. United States v. Fahey, - F.2d (9th Cir. 1969), affirmning - F. Supp.
- , - (N.D. Cal. 19 - ).
10. Compare Martin v. United States, 317 F.2d 753, 754 (9th Cir. 1963); Abdul v. United
States, 254 F.2d 292, 294 (9th Cir. 1958), with United States v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240, 247 (3d
Cir. 1966), and Haner v. United States, 315 F.2d 792, 794 (5th Cir. 1963). Cf Yarborough v.
United States, 230 F.2d 56, 61 (4th Cir. 1956).
11. See United States v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240, 247 (3d Cir. 1966); Haner v. United States,
315 F.2d 792, 794 (5th Cir. 1963).
12. Martin v. United States, 317 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1963); see United States v. Fahey,
F.2d - (9th Cir. 1969).
13. "Negligent" and "inadvertent" are used here to connote a lack of awareness or
knowledge by a defendant of his duty to file a return or to pay a tax. See J. HALL, GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 114-17 (2d ed. 1960); G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW, THE
GENERAL PART § 36 (2d ed. 1961).
14. See United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933); United States v. Fahey, - F.2d
- (9th Cir. 1969); United States v. Johnson, 386 F.2d 630, 632 (3d Cir. 1967); Edwards v.
United States, 375 F.2d 862, 864 (9th Cir. 1967); United States v. Ostendorff, 371 F.2d 729,
731 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied. 386 U.S. 982 (1968); United States v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240
(3d. Cir. 1966); United States v. Schipani, 362 F.2d 825, 831 (2d Cir.) (dicta), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 934 (1966); United States v. Marquez, 332 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
890 (1965); Edwards v. United States, 321 F.2d 324, 325 (5th Cir. 1963), rev'd on rehearing,
334 F.2d 360, 364 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1000 (1965); Haner v. United States,
315 F.2d 792, 794 (5th Cir. 1963); United States v. Palermo, 259 F.2d 872 (3d Cir. 1958);
Abdul v. United States, 254 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1958); Yarborough v. United States, 230 F.2d
56, 61 (4th Cir. 1956); United States v. Thompson, 230 F. Supp. 530, 532 (D. Conn.), ajj'dper
curiam, 338 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v. Di Silvestro, 147 F. Supp. 300, 303-04
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1969/iss2/5
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return nor the nonpayment of taxes proscribed by that section are
criminal unless the taxpayer has knowledge of both his legal
obligation and that his acts might result in noncompliance. 5 The
disagreement between the circuits, then, is narrowed to whether, if
.'wilfullN - is defined to a jury of laymen in terms of "capriciously or
with a careless disregard whether one has the right so to act" in
addition to "with bad purpose or without grounds for believing that
one's act is lawful or without reasonable cause for believing ...
whether one has the right so to act,"'" the jury might convict a
defendant for inadvertent or negligent violation of the statute.
The Fifth Circuit's rejection of the language is based on this
possibility.t' It treats "careless" and "inadvertent" as synonyms and
holds that neither term adequately defines the meaning of "wilfully"
as used in the statute. The Fifth Circuit does not consider the use of
"capriciously" because the word was not before it as part of the
contested instructions."
The Third Circuit rejects all but the "bad purpose" language in the
Ninth Circuit's instructions. The Third Circuit defines "wilfully" in
terms of -evil motive.'- While the court does not further define "evil
motive." it rejects knowing or intentional failure to file a return or
pay a tax as sufficient, when standing alone, to establish the mens rea
required by Section 7203.'9 The words "evil motive" or "bad
purpose" provide little help in understanding the meaning of
"wilfully," but the court's rejection of "knowing or intentional"
conduct as insufficient indicates that "wilfully" requires at least
conscious or advertent noncompliance with a statutory duty.
The Third Circuit's suggested instructions for defining "wilfully"
juxtaposes its requirement of "evil motive" to the concept of gross
negligence to demonstrate the point of differentiation between that
mental element which is sufficient for conviction under Section 7203,
and that Ahich is not" Gross negligence is an inadvertent state of
(E.D Pa 1t97). (I spies %'. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497-99 (1943). But see Martin v.
United 'States, 317 1- 2d 753 (9th Cir. 1963) (the holding in this case is unclear from the opinion,
in that the judge hNpothesizes the facts to arrive at his result).
I See note 12, Nupra, and authorities cited therein.
16 Martin United States, 317 F.2d 753, 754 (9th Cir. 1963).
17 Haner United States, 315 F2d 792, 794 (5th Cir. 1963).
IS 1- nited states V, Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1966); United States v. Palermo, 259 F.2d
872 Od( ir 9SX)
19 United States Palermo, 259 F.2d 872, 881 (3d Cir. 1958).
20 United States v. Vtiello, 363 F,2d 240, 242 (3d Cir. 1966); United States v. Palermo, 259
F- 2d s72. S82 (3d Cir. 195s).
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mind' Because of this juxtaposition, it can be assumed that the Third
Circuit, as well as the Fifth Circuit, is concerned with the danger of
conviction for inadvertent-negligent-violation. For this reason, the
Third Circuit rejects the Ninth Circuit's instruction.
The Ninth Circuit's language is dealt with by dissenting opinions in
the Third and Fifth Circuits 2 The Fifth Circuit dissent deals only
with the language "careless disregard whether one has the right so to
act." 23 The dissent's argument is that taking the instruction as a
whole, the addition of the challenged language does not create a
danger of conviction for negligent or inadvertent violation. The
unmodified word "disregard" means "the conscious, deliberate
flouting of the law. ' 24 This requires knowledge of the law's
requirements. Modifying "disregard" withi "careless" does not remove
the element of consciousness in "disregard" but simply introduces an
element of indifference or brash irresponsibility.
The dissent in the Third Circuit argues that the language "careless
disregard whether one has the right so to act"2 is lifted from the
Supreme Court's list of definitions for "wilfully" in Murdock v.
United States? The Supreme Court does not use it as a synonym for
negligence and for that reason its use by the district court is correct.
The judge rejected "capriciously" for its complete lack of meaning."
Together, the majority and dissenting opinions for the Third and
Fifth Circuits indicate that there is ground for dispute over the use of
"careless disregard whether one has the right so to act" apart from
the instructions defining "wilfully" in Section 7203. The word
"capriciously," as observed by the dissent in the Third Circuit, lacks
concrete meaning and should be rejected 9
How to articulate the state of mind necessary for conviction under
Section 7203 is purely a semantic question. Courts are often as
perplexed over which language to use in an instruction defining
"wilfully" as they are over the meaning of the word in its statutory
21. G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW, THE GENERAL PART §§ 36-38 (2d ed. 1961).
22. United States v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240, 245 (3d Cir. 1966); Haner v. United States, 315
F.2d 792, 795 (5th Cir. 1963).
23. Haner v. United States, 315 F.2d 792, 795 (5th Cir. 1963).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. United States v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240, 245 (3d Cir. 1966).
27. 290 U.S. 389, 396 (1933).




context2 0 When the words used to define that mental element are so
ambiguous as to precipitate disagreement between circuits, what
guarantee is there that a jury will grasp the correct meaning and
apply the proper standard to determine whether a defendant's state of
mind justifies conviction? The answer is not to be found in precise
definitions of words by appellate courts as attempted by the Third
and I-ifth Circuits." Neither is it to be found in the assumption that
once the Supreme Court uses such language it must be correct, as the
dissenter in the Third Circuit contends.32 In both situations, the jury
must necessarily struggle with the same definitional problems
illustrated by the division among the circuits. The resolution is
properly the function of the legislature and the courts but not the
jury.
The legislature can use specific terms describing the requisite mens
rea as the Model Penal Code suggests. 3 Failing this, the courts are
forced to develop a standard definition of an originally ambiguous
term. Since all circuits will not resolve the ambiguity identically,
conflict and confusion is inevitable. It is submitted, however, that
when the resolution for the ambiguity might produce criminal liability
where a crime is not in fact committed, it should not be considered as
an alternative. Therefore, the weakness inherent in the language "with
careless disregard whether one has the right so to act" should
preclude its use for purposes of defining "wilfully" in Section 7203.
30. se,, eg. state %. Foran, 255 Mo. 213, 164 S.W. 215 (1914); Remington & Helstad, The
Menial 1Iement in Crime - -1 L izslative Problem, 1952 Wis. L. REv. 644, 665-66.
31 See United States %v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1966); Haner v. United States, 315
i 2d 792 5th (ir 1963). United States v. Palermo, 259 F.2d 872 (3d Cir. 1958).
32 United States v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240, 246 (3d Cir. 1966).
33 M\loni PI,\L CODE §§ 2.01-.02 (1962).
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